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I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the general theme of this volume, I begin my contribution by noting
that I have always been skeptical of the strong forms of the convergence thesis in
comparative law. That is, I doubt that the differences between civil law and common law
are crumbling, soon to be confined to the dustbin of history, or that the legal systems
across the world will shortly be left with few distinctive characteristics. 1 Of course, there
is bound to be some convergence of rules and approaches across legal cultures as various
forms of international interaction increase. Transnational actors, power politics, and
exposure to foreign approaches, among other things, all may cause a legal system to

*
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1

See e.g. B.S. Markesinis, ed., The Gradual Convergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994);

Ugo A. Mattei, Luisa Antonioli & Andrea Rossato, “Comparative Law and Economics” in Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest, eds., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. 1 (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 2000) 505, at 508-14.
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adopt solutions and approaches from abroad. 2

But there are likely to be plenty of

countervailing causal processes at work in law reform, and civil procedure reform is no
exception. 3 Moreover, as Alan Watson’s work nicely demonstrates, there have been
whole-scale legal transplants long before the advent of globalization. 4 Thus, the presence
of transplants in procedural reform does not necessarily indicate that we are inevitably
moving towards convergence.
I also think, however, that the differences between civil law and common law
procedure have frequently been overdrawn. Juxtaposing the two systems provides many
insights, to be sure. Civil law and common law countries, respectively, share a
considerable history of ideas, concepts, and institutions. That common history, however,
is not equally strong in all countries, and it began to diverge at various points in time for
different jurisdictions. 5 Moreover, the advent of the constitutional state and, later, the
modern welfare state brought with it other formative influences, some of which are
shared across the civil law / common law divide. 6
From this perspective, it should come as no surprise that the current procedural
reform project in Switzerland—the creation of the first Federal Code of Civil Procedure
in Swiss history—shows few signs of bringing Swiss civil procedure, traditionally seen as
part of the civil law family, any closer to common law concepts and approaches. The
thrust of the reform has been to create a single, unified code of civil procedure by

2

Cf. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Transnational Litigation in the United States: The Emergence of a

New Field of Law” (book review essay) (2007) 55 Am. J. Comp. L. 793, at 799-801.
3

See e.g. Ralf Michaels, “Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction” (2007) 27 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1003.

4

See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2d ed. (Athens:

University of Georgia Press, 1993).
5

See e.g. Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al., Comparative Law, 6th ed. (New York: Foundation Press,

1998), at 257-63, 281, 283-313.
6

See e.g. William B. Ewald, “Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?”

(1995) 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, at 1987-88, 2046-65.
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combining the best features from the various cantonal codes. 7 Foreign rules and
approaches, however, have remained largely off the table.
In this chapter, I shall paint the landscape of procedural reform in Switzerland and
use the product of that effort to inquire into the reasons why the reformers in that country
chose to forego virtually any adoption of foreign concepts or approaches, whether from
civil law or common law origins. In doing so, I hope to contribute to our understanding of
the forces that oppose, as well as the forces that promote, convergence in procedural
reform.
II. THE CURRENT REFORM EFFORT AND ITS BACKGROUND
The current civil procedure reform in Switzerland is part of a much larger package to
reform procedural law and the federal judiciary. This package includes the creation, for
the first time in Swiss history, of a federal code of civil procedure, a federal code of
criminal procedure, a lower federal criminal court, and a lower federal administrative
court. 8 This is quite an extensive reform package by any standard. Although many of
these reforms have been proposed for a very long time, they never came to fruition.
Change finally arrived in 2000, however, with the strong vote of the Swiss populace in
favor of a constitutional amendment giving the federal government the power to
implement the above-mentioned reforms. 9 Such popular support in favor of federal power
in this area is a relatively new phenomenon, however.
Since 1848, Switzerland has been a parliamentary democracy with a federal form of
government. Governmental power is shared by the federal government and the twenty-six

7

See e.g. Christoph Leuenberger, “Die neue schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung” in Thomas

Geiser et al., eds., Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen des Wirtschaftsstandortes Schweiz (Zürich: Dike, 2007)
601, at 602 [Geiser et al., Rahmenbedingungen].
8

See

“Justizreform”

in

Bundesamt

für

Justiz,

<http://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/de/home/themen/staat_und_buerger/gesetzgebung/justizreform.html>
[“Justizreform”].
9

Ibid.
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cantons (or states). The 1848 Constitution provided for relatively little federal power
outside of foreign affairs, monetary policy, and tariffs. 10 But various groups, encouraged
by nationalist events in neighboring Germany and Italy, soon proposed the adoption of a
new constitution that would have significantly increased the areas of federal power—
including in criminal and private law and procedure. 11 However, the proposal was
rejected by popular vote in 1872, due to opposition in both conservative catholic and antifederalist French-speaking cantons. 12 A scaled-back proposal for a new constitution with
only modest increases in federal powers was adopted in 1874 and amended in 1898.
Since then, substantive private law and criminal law have been a matter of federal
legislative power. 13 Civil and criminal procedure and the organization of the courts, on
the other hand, remained the province of state law. 14 Moreover, the federal judiciary has
been limited to a federal Supreme Court, which acts as a limited constitutional court and
as a final arbiter on questions of substantive federal law. 15
Not surprisingly, the resulting differences in civil procedure and court organization in
the various cantons produced difficulties in the quickly growing class of cases that cross
state borders. Hence, attempts to introduce a unified national system of civil procedure
10

Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (September 12, 1848), reproduced in

Wilhelm Fetscherin, ed., Repertorium der Abschiede der Eidgenössischen Tagsatzungen aus den Jahren
1814-1848, vol. 2, 764 (Bern: K.J. Wyss, 1876), arts. 13-59.
11

See e.g. Thomas Sutter, Auf dem Weg zur Rechtseinheit im schweizerischen Zivilprozessrecht

(Zürich: Schulthess, 1998), at 4-38.
12

See e.g. Ulrich Häfelin & Walter Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht, 2d ed. (Zürich:

Schulthess, 1988), at 17.
13

See Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (May 29, 1874), AS 1, 1 (1875),

art. 64 (providing for federal power in some areas of private law, including the law of obligations and
intellectual property); Constitution of 1874, as amended on November 13, 1898, AS 16, 885, 888 (1898)
arts. 64(II) & 64bis(I) (providing for federal power in all areas of substantive private and criminal law).
14

Ibid., arts. 64(III) & 64bis(II). There is one important exception: The procedure for enforcing

money judgments and uncontested monetary claims, including bankruptcy law, was a matter of federal law
as well. See art. 64(I).
15

Ibid., arts. 110-114. The role of the Court as a constitutional court is limited primarily because of

its inability to declare federal statutes void as unconstitutional. See art. 113(III).
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were made on a number of occasions. None of them, however, came to fruition. The
rejection of the 1872 proposal cast a long shadow. 16 Moreover, straw polls among
various bar groups over time indicated that judges and litigators quite liked the existing
system with different procedural rules in different cantons. 17
Another problem that soon manifested itself was the lack of uniformity in enforcing
federal substantive law. As proceduralists across the globe know, there is no clear
dividing line between substantive and procedural law, and avowedly procedural rules
frequently have substantive consequences. 18 The Federal Supreme Court thus began a
slow but steady process of creating federal common law in the guise of ensuring uniform
application of federal substantive law. By the end of that process, the Court had managed
to declare many a traditional area of state procedure entirely a matter of federal
substantive law, including res judicata, lis pendens, declaratory and preliminary relief,
and group litigation rights. 19 Catching on to the problem, the federal legislature began to
adopt traditionally procedural rules in federal substantive legislation, most prominently
rules on personal jurisdiction, burden of proof, evidence, costs, and speed of
proceedings. 20 This proliferation of federal rules accelerated during the second half of the
twentieth century, culminating in the adoption of a new federal Act on Private
International Law 21 in 1987. In that Act, federal lawmakers adopted an exhaustive set of
16

See e.g. Sutter, supra note 11, at 55-72.

17

See e.g. Frank, Sträuli & Messmer, Kommentar zur Zürcherischen ZPO, 3d ed. (Zürich:

Schulthess, 1997), at 13; ibid., at 62.
18

See e.g. Stephen B. Burbank, “Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of Ambiguity and

Hypocrisy” (2006) 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1924, at 1926-27.
19

See e.g. Oscar Vogel & Karl Spühler, Grundriss des Zivilprozessrechts, 8th ed. (Bern: Stämpfli,

2006), at 68-71; Stephen Berti, Zum Einfluss ungeschriebenen Bundesrechts auf den kantonalen
Zivilprozess im Lichte der Rechtsprechung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts (Zürich: Schulthess, 1989).
Regarding group litigation rights, see e.g. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Class Actions and Group Litigation in
Switzerland” (2006) 27 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 301, at 316-26 [Baumgartner, “Class Actions”].
20

See e.g. Vogel & Spühler, ibid., at 62-67.

21

Bundesgesetz über das internationale Privatrecht of December 18, 1987, SR 291 [Private

International Law Act].
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rules on personal jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
in international cases, in addition to a new choice of law regime.
By the late 1980s, it was clear to any Swiss lawyer that there was, in fact, a
substantial body of federal procedural law. Apart from the question whether the
constitutional preservation of the power to make procedural law for the states had been
undermined, this had significantly weakened the argument that an adoption of federal
procedural rules was neither feasible nor necessary. 22 But it took the ratification of the
Lugano Convention 23 to precipitate change. The Lugano Convention sets uniform rules
on personal jurisdiction, lis pendens, and the recognition of judgments in cross-border
cases involving EC and EFTA member states. Ratification of the Lugano Convention had
the jarring effect that, in some situations, cantonal courts were required to treat foreign
litigants better than litigants from other cantons.24 Moreover, the adoption of the Lugano
Convention and the new Private International Law Act further increased the difficulty for
litigants to locate the applicable procedural law in the thicket of international treaties,
proliferating federal statutes, state civil procedure codes, federal common law, and state
practice. 25 The clear vote in favor of an updated and streamlined federal constitution by
the Swiss populace in 1998 gave the final impetus to put before the people a
constitutional amendment providing for federal power in civil and criminal procedure.
That amendment was adopted in 2000. 26
Given the experience with the Lugano Convention, the first piece of federal
legislation passed under the new federal power was an act that entirely federalized the

22
23

See e.g. Frank, Sträuli & Messmer, supra note 17, at 15-16.
Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition of judgments in civil and commercial matters,

1988 O.J. (L 319) 40 [Lugano Convention].
24

See e.g. Frank, Sträuli & Messmer, supra note 17, at 16.

25

See e.g. Adrian Staehelin, Daniel Staehlin & Pascal Grolimund, Zivilprozessrecht (Zürich:

Schulthess, 2008), at 15; Fridolin M.R. Walther, Die Auslegung des schweizerischen Zivilprozessrechts,
insbesondere des Bundesgesetzes über den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen (Bern: Stämpfli, 2002), at 132-33.
26

See supra text accompanying note 8.
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law of personal jurisdiction. 27 In addition, the Justice Department impaneled a committee
of experts to draft a new federal code of civil procedure. The Committee presented its
work product in June of 2003. 28 After a public comment period, the Federal Council (the
executive) presented an adapted version of the Committee’s draft to Parliament.
Parliament adopted the final version of the Code on December 19, 2008. 29 The deadline
for a possible referendum passed on April 16, 2009. Thus, the new Code is planned to
enter into force in January of 2011.
III. THE NEW CODE
From the beginning, the Committee’s primary task was to create a code of civil
procedure that would break the long spell of shipwrecked unification proposals. The
Justice Department thus carefully selected committee members to ensure representation
from bench and bar as well as from academia; from small firms as well as from large;
from French- and Italian-speaking regions as well as from German; from Catholic as well
as from Protestant areas; and so on. Accordingly, the Committee never considered
adopting truly novel approaches—including foreign ones—that would not mesh easily
with traditional Swiss procedural concepts. 30 Similarly, the Committee knew better than
to model its work on the code of a single canton. Instead, it attempted to draw from all
cantonal codes of civil procedure, although more so from the recently reformed ones.31 In
addition, the Committee decided to restate the federal statutory and common law rules
that had developed over time to preempt state procedural law in domestic cases. 32
27

Bundesgesetz über den Gerichtsstand in Zivilsachen of March 24, 2001, SR 272.

28

See

Schweizerische

Expertenkommission,

Zivilprozessordnung
June

(ZPO),

Bericht
2003,

zum

Vorentwurf

der
online:

<http://www.bj.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/staat_buerger/gesetzgebung/zivilprozess.Par.0006.File.tmp/vnber-d.pdf>, at 6 [Begleitbericht].
29

Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung of December 19, 2008, BBl 2009, at 21 [ZPO or Code].

30

See Begleitbericht, supra note 28, at 15.

31
32

Ibid.
See e.g. Hans-Peter Walter, “Auf dem Weg zur Schweizerischen Zivilprozessordnung” (2004) 100

Schweizerische Juristenzeitung 313, at 319. On those rules, see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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The end result, after adoption by Parliament, is a Code that should look familiar to all
Swiss lawyers, although they may find surprises in the details. With 408 relatively brief
articles, the Code is considerably shorter than its counterparts in surrounding countries. It
achieves this, in true Swiss tradition, 33 by eschewing much technical language and
complex conceptual elaboration, as well as by leaving various details for practice to
develop.
The Code begins with a general part, specifying the scope of application and dealing
with issues common to all kinds of proceedings, such as personal jurisdiction in domestic
(as opposed to transnational) cases; recusal; joinder of parties and claims; calculation of
amount in controversy; rules on costs; and general rules on conducting the proceedings
and on taking evidence. 34 The Code then contains rules on ordinary proceedings, which
begin with a written complaint and answer, followed by a preliminary hearing, a fullfledged main hearing, and judgment. 35 Following that, there are provisions for a number
of special proceedings. These include simple (e.g., less formal, more oral) proceedings
for amounts in controversy of sFr. 30,000 (approximately US $25,000) or less; summary
proceedings (e.g., for preliminary relief), in which only certain kinds of evidence are
permitted or in which there is a lower standard of proof, or both; and family law
proceedings, where the Code abandons many of its underlying classical liberal concepts
in favor of increased judicial supervision in order to ensure equal treatment of the
potentially weaker party. 36 The Code then contains rules on appeals and enforcement
proceedings, 37 although the enforcement of money judgments remains the province of a

33

See e.g. Franz Wieacker, A History of Private Law in Europe, trans. by Tony Weir (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1995) at 389-91.
34

ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 1-196.

35

Ibid., arts. 197-242.

36

Ibid., arts. 243-307.

37

Ibid., arts. 308-52.
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much older federal law on debtor/creditor relations and bankruptcy. 38 Finally, there is a
chapter on domestic arbitration. 39
The drafters ensured that the new Code complies with international treaties ratified
by Switzerland, including several Hague Conventions and, most importantly, the
European Convention on Human Rights. Thus, some rights of the parties are more clearly
defined under the Code than they may currently be in cantonal practice. For instance, the
Code states a right of the parties to prove their respective cases, 40 as well as a privilege
against self-incrimination. 41 Similarly, the judge will be obligated to disregard illegally
obtained evidence unless she considers the interest in finding the truth to prevail. 42
Apart from these clarifications required by international law, however, there are only
two foreign imports in the Code. The first is a brief chapter on party- and judge-initiated
mediation that was added to the Committee’s proposed draft upon heavy lobbying by
mediation firms from large cities.43 The second is inspired by a provision in the Lugano
Convention, itself based on procedures known in a number of European countries: the
parties to a contract can have a promissory note drawn up and authenticated by a notary
(a specialized lawyer in Switzerland). 44 The resulting note is enforceable like a court
judgment, except that a few narrow defenses are permitted.45 On the other hand, a request
by a few members of Parliament to consider the introduction of class actions for labor,
landlord-tenant, and consumer disputes received only scant attention from the

38

Cf. supra note 14.

39

ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 353-99.

40

Ibid., art. 152(1).

41

Ibid., art. 163(1)(a).

42

Ibid., art. 152(2).

43

Ibid., arts. 213-18. Most importantly, article 214(1) provides that: “[t]he court can recommend at

any time that the parties consider mediation.”
44

Lugano Convention, supra note 23, art. 50. On the profession of the notary in civil law

jurisdictions such as Switzerland, see e.g. Schlesinger et al., supra note 5, at 22-24.
45

ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 347-52.
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Committee, which brushed it aside with the comment that such a device is foreign to
Swiss traditions. 46
Thus, the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure remains true to Swiss tradition and
shows little evidence of transplants from other parts of the world (other than those
mandated by international treaty). A large portion of the Code is rooted in what is usually
considered civil law tradition. This is in evidence in the strict separation of private and
public law litigation (the new Code only applies to the former); 47 judge-controlled
litigation and taking of evidence; 48 the absence of juries; 49 the absence of common lawstyle rules of evidence; 50 the absence of motion practice; 51 clear delimitation of judicial
power; 52 de-novo appeals; and a small litigation package (limited joinder of parties and
claims, no US-style discovery, and a narrow bite of res judicata). 53 The Code also
continues the established European tradition of generally charging court costs and the
winner’s attorney’s fees to the losing party. 54

46

See Begleitbericht, supra note 28, at 15, 45-46. For more background on the decision to avoid

introducing class actions in the new Code, see Baumgartner, “Class Actions,” supra note 19, at 309-16.
47

See e.g. Baumgartner, “Class Actions,” ibid., at 307-08.

48

See e.g. Martin Kaufmann, “Beweiserhebung durch das Gericht vs. Beweiserhebung durch die

Parteien” in Geiser et al., Rahmenbedingungen, supra note 7, 657, at 657-58.
49

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there were proposals for introducing a civil jury in

various cantons. The Canton of Zurich actually did introduce a civil jury in 1874, but abolished it again in
1911. See e.g. R.C. van Caenegem, “History of European Civil Procedure” in Mauro Cappelletti, chief ed.,
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, vol. 16 (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), The
Hague: Mouton, New York: Oceana, 1973) 95.
50

Cf. Schlesinger et al., supra note 5, at 443-45.

51

Ibid., at 435-36.

52

See e.g. Baumgartner, “Class Actions,” supra note 19, at 321.

53

On these matters, see e.g. Samuel P. Baumgartner, “Related Actions” (1998) 3 Zeitschrift für

Zivilprozess International 203, at 210. In a slight deviation from the depiction in the text, the Code does
extend the appel en cause, a limited form of third-party complaint, from the French-speaking cantons to the
rest of Switzerland. See ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 81-82.
54

Ibid., arts. 104-12.
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At the same time, however, the new Code displays a number of features with a long
history in at least some cantonal codes that may be surprising to those who have been fed
the usual diet of descriptions of civil law procedure. First, most Swiss judges have, for
centuries, been selected in some form of public or parliamentary election. 55 After all, one
of the major reasons that the various Swiss states sought independence from Habsburg
from 1291 on was their unwillingness to be subject to far-away judges imposed by the
empire. 56 Although judicial elections in most cantons are usually a matter of internal
party politics and, thus, rarely involve public election campaigns, the possibility of not
being reelected or reappointed after the usual 4- or 6-year service period,57 although rare,
is real. 58 Despite this feature, there is, in some cantons, a tradition of a career judiciary of
sorts in the sense that many lower-level judges begin their careers as long-term judicial
clerks. From there, they are then elected to a judgeship. In other cantons, a considerable
number of judges, especially at the appellate level, come to office with at least some
practical experience outside the judiciary. Since the new Code is leaving the organization
of the judiciary largely to the cantons, 59 none of this is likely to change.
Along similar lines, there are a few cantons that never gave up the early Germanic
tradition of public deliberation and vote of the courts at both the first instance and the

55

In three cantons, at least some of the lower-level judges are appointed by the state’s highest court,

rather than elected. See e.g. Alfred Bühler, “Von der Wahl und Auswahl der Richter” in Heinrich Honsell
et al., eds., Festschrift für Heinz Rey zum 60. Geburtstag (Zürich: Schulthess, 2003) 521, at 533.
56

Similarly, the newly independent states soon worked to remove themselves from the jurisdiction

of the far-away judges imposed by the Catholic Church. On all this, see Emil Schurter & Hans Fritzsche,
Das Zivilprozessrecht des Bundes (Zürich: Rascher, 1924), at 5-29.
57

In a number of cantons, the larger political parties use specialized committees to vet a candidate’s

professional quality. See e.g. Vogel & Spühler, supra note 19, at 87.
58

A few recent instances in which cantonal and federal judges either almost failed or did fail to be

reelected because of unpopular decisions have led to renewed questions about whether this system
adequately protects judicial independence. See e.g. Stephan Gass, “Wie Sollen Richter und Richterinnen
gewählt werden? Wahl und Wiederwahl unter dem Aspekt richerlicher Unabhängikeit” (2007) 16 Aktuelle
Juristische Praxis 593.
59

ZPO, supra note 29, art. 3.
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appellate levels. All cantons have, however, since been required by federal law to provide
the parties with a written judgment and opinion in cases that can be appealed to the
Federal Supreme Court. 60 Moreover, written opinions in Switzerland follow the civil law
tradition of stating only the opinion of the entire court, without any dissents or
concurrences. Yet, in some cantons, deliberation and vote still occur on the bench in the
presence of the parties and any members of the public who wish to observe the
proceedings. 61 However, since the cantons that follow the practice of the surrounding
countries of secret deliberation and vote seem to feel equally strongly about the
importance of their approach for the integrity of the judicial process, 62 the new Code
leaves the matter up to the cantons to regulate. 63 The Code does, however, provide that
the public is excluded from the entire proceedings in certain matters, including all family
law cases. 64
A third, perhaps unexpected, feature 65 of the new Code is the presence of a single,
concentrated, oral hearing (Hauptverhandlung, audience de jugement). 66 I hesitate to call

60

Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht of June 17, 2005, SR 173.110, art. 112.

61

See e.g. Gesetz betreffend die Zivilprozessordnung für den Kanton Bern of July 7, 1918, BSG

271.1, art. 204 [Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Bern]; Zivilprozessordnung of Sept. 11, 1966,
BGS 221.1, § 53 [Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Solothurn; Code de procédure civile du canton
de Neuchâtel of Sept. 30, 1991, RSN 251.1, art. 333 [Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Neuchâtel].
62

On the history behind this approach, see e.g. Kurt H. Nadelmann, “The Judicial Dissent:

Publication v. Secrecy” (1959) 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 415.
63

ZPO, supra note 29, art. 54(2).

64

Ibid., art. 54(3), (4).

65

Cf. Benjamin Kaplan, “An American Lawyer in the Queen’s Courts: Impressions of English Civil

Procedure” (1969) 69 Mich. L. Rev. 821, at 841:
What then is the grand discriminant, the watershed feature, so to speak, which shows the
English and American systems to be consanguine and sets them apart from the German,
the Italian, and others in the civil law family? I think it is the single-episode trial as
contrasted with discontinous or staggered proof-taking. This characteristic must greatly
affect the anterior proceedings that culminate in trial.
66

ZPO, supra note 29, arts. 228-34.
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it a trial only because it is held without a jury and because the judge, in civil law fashion,
remains in charge of the hearing and of the questioning of the witnesses. Again, this is
nothing new. Some of the procedural codes of the cantons have provided for this kind of
main hearing for a long time. 67 They therefore made a much clearer break with the
seemingly endless series of evidentiary hearings in Romano-canonical procedure than did
the German Code of Civil Procedure of 1877. 68 And they did so without relegating the
taking of evidence to the pre-hearing instruction, as has been the case in French civil
procedure since 1806. 69 In order for a concentrated oral hearing to work, these cantons
have provided for some form of preliminary hearing beforehand, at which the judge
encourages the parties to clarify their claims and attempts to identify, with the parties, the
relevant pieces of evidence, including proposed witnesses. 70 If unexpected evidence

67

Article 176(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of Bern, supra note 61, provides:
If [after the exchange of the pleadings] the instructing judge [i.e., the panel member
delegated to prepare the main hearing] considers the matter insufficiently clear to permit
a judgment to be handed down at the time of the main hearing, he summons the parties
and discusses the case with them in free conversation. He shall make use of his [power to
ask questions not directly raised by the pleadings], especially by questioning the parties
so as to clarify contested facts and to encourage them to amend their pleadings [with
regard to alleged facts and proposed means of proof] accordingly.

68

Zivilprozessordnung [German Code of Civil Procedure] of Jan. 30, 1877, 1877 RGBl at 83. In the

United States, Justice Kaplan has coined the term “conference method” to refer to the series of evidentiary
hearings under the German Code of 1877. See Benjamin Kaplan, “Civil Procedure – Reflections on the
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Verlag, 2004) 26, at 33-37.
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become reality at least in some courts. See e.g. Peter Gottwald, “Civil Procedure Reform in Germany”
(1997) 45 Am. J. Comp. L. 753, at 761.
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nevertheless turns up during the main hearing, it is, of course, possible to adjourn that
hearing. In some cantons, the preliminary hearing is also the time for the judge, more or
less gently, to suggest settlement—an approach that appears to have made it into the new
Code. 71
Fourth, there are a number of civil law jurisdictions that sustained the prohibition of
party testimony from Roman Canonical procedure well into the twentieth century on the
theory that party testimony is notoriously self-serving and, thus, useless as a means of
proof. 72 Not so in a number of Swiss cantons, where parties as well as non-parties have
long been subject to questioning by the judge. In those cantons, there remains a
distinction between the testimony of non-parties and that of parties, whereby the latter
usually cannot result in a perjury charge if a party has intentionally given factually
incorrect answers. 73 Again, the assumption is that parties are likely to at least slant their
testimony. Technically, the parties are thus not considered witnesses. Nevertheless, the
drafters of these codes realized that there may still be considerable probative value in the
testimony of parties.74 The new Code adopts one form of this approach: The parties are to
be told that they may be subject to a disciplinary fine of SFr. 2000-5000 (approximately
US $1500-3750) for false testimony. 75 However, since they are not technically witnesses,
the parties cannot commit perjury, with one exception: the court may ask a party to
respond to specific questions on pain of a perjury charge in the case of false testimony. 76
This is usually done where a point of fact in the knowledge of one party is particularly

71

ZPO, supra note 29, art. 226(2).

72

See e.g. Dagmar Coester-Waltijen, “Parteiaussage und Parteivernehmung am Ende des 20.
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important to the outcome of the case and the court has no other means to establish the
truth of that fact. 77
Another principle of German common law procedure with considerable staying
power in Europe is the Roman law rule of nemo contra se edere tenetur (nobody can be
required to produce a document against himself). 78 Accordingly, German procedure did
not generally permit the judge to order a party to produce a document identified by the
opponent as being relevant to prove its case until 2002. 79 Other European countries got
rid of the doctrine only a few decades ago, and then only to some extent. 80 Again, some
Swiss cantons abolished this approach long ago. 81 Along with these cantons, the new
Code provides that both parties and non-parties have an obligation to provide evidence in
their control. 82 Parties refusing to live up to that obligation face adverse inferences on the

77
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represented the first step towards permitting party testimony, long before England and the United States
permitted parties to testify. See e.g. Coester-Waltijen, supra note 72, at 274-76, 277-79. For a description
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Stanford University Press, 2007), at 119-20; Jolowicz, supra note 69, at 34.
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Perspective (Torino: Giappichelli, 2005) 67, at 75-76.
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merits. 83 Non-parties who refuse to cooperate risk a fine as well as being held liable for
the extra court costs arising from their behavior.84
A final feature of the new Swiss Code that may look familiar to common law
lawyers, especially from the United States, is its strong emphasis on settlement. This
feature, too, however, has a long tradition in Switzerland. In this case, the tradition goes
back to the French Code of Civil Procedure of 1806 85 and preceding statutes passed right
after the French Revolution. According to those statutes, the parties had to submit to
conciliation in front of a justice of the peace before a lawsuit could be filed. 86 The idea
soon caught on in Switzerland. 87 However, not all cantons adopted this approach. In
Geneva, for example, the drafters of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1819 88 left pre-action
conciliation voluntary. They did, however, permit the judge to suggest settlement at any
time during the proceedings, well aware of the dangers of such an approach. 89 This
approach, too, was soon adopted by many cantons. Thus, while most surrounding
countries only briefly experimented with conciliation and other forms of alternative
dispute resolution, and did not return to these matters until very recently in their
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procedural laws, 90 both mandatory conciliation and judge-supervised settlement
negotiations have been a mainstay in many of the Swiss procedural codes since the early
nineteenth century. 91 Given the long Swiss tradition in this area, it is not surprising that
the new Code generally requires the parties to bring their case before a “settlement
authority” before they are permitted to file suit.92 It is equally unsurprising that the Code
permits the court to suggest settlement at the preliminary hearing stage. 93 From here,
then, it did not require a leap of faith to equally permit the judge to bring up the
possibility of mediation, an approach for which there is no Swiss tradition. 94
As these examples demonstrate, the laws of various Swiss cantons have long shared
more features with civil procedure in the United States and, to a lesser extent, with other
common law countries, than traditional descriptions of civil law litigation systems would
have one believe. Largely, this has been the result of developments unique to Switzerland
rather than of borrowing from the common law. To me, this is simply further evidence
that the distinction between common law and civil law procedure has been overdrawn.
IV. REASONS FOR THE DEARTH OF INTERNATIONAL BORROWING
IN THE NEW CODE

With that in mind, it is not, perhaps, too surprising to learn that the only borrowing in
the new Swiss Code of Civil Procedure is that imposed by international treaty law.
Nevertheless, one may wonder why the drafters of the new Code failed to adopt any other
90

See e.g. C.H. van Rhee, “Introduction” in van Rhee, European Traditions, supra note 86, 185, at

185-87; Walter, supra note 79, at 73-74.
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places, such as in the city of Bern, mandatory conciliation sessions are scheduled in 15-minute intervals,
thus leaving little time for real settlement talks. Other courts have become incredibly successful in getting
cases settled. Yet lawyers sometimes complain of judicial strong-arming.
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proceedings. See art. 198. In addition, the parties can agree to forego the conciliation proceeding in cases
with an amount in controversy of sFr. 100,000 (approximately US $80,000) or more. See art. 199.
93
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features from abroad, while the European Community surrounding Switzerland is in the
process of harmonizing various aspects of civil procedure, perhaps with the ultimate goal
of unifying litigation procedure altogether. Obviously, it is difficult to know every reason
leading to this omission. Having been on the inside of the lawmaking process in
Switzerland for three years (although not with regard to this project) and having had
conversations with a number of the members of the Committee of Experts who drafted
the new Code over time, however, I will try to identify what I gather to be the major
reasons for the drafters’ inclination to shun borrowing.
First and foremost, the Committee’s task was to overcome the long history of
opposition to a federally unified code of civil procedure. For that purpose, the Committee
had to tread carefully. Departing too much from the rules and concepts known in the
various cantons simply would have put that mission in danger. Moreover, the
Committee’s chosen approach of steering clear of controversial new subject matter is in
line with the requirements of Swiss consensus democracy: Switzerland is a multi-party
democracy with a government that has been shared by representatives of the four leading
parties in Parliament since 1959. No party has had control over either Parliament or the
executive since 1891 or has even had a majority in either institution since 1954. The
result has been a consensus approach to lawmaking that tends to disfavor bold, new
ideas. 95
The Committee tried to meet this challenge by drawing from the existing cantonal
codes of civil procedure rather than by imposing new concepts or by adopting a single
cantonal code. 96 That approach immediately brought to light a basic problem. Few Swiss
lawyers have practiced under the procedural code of more than one canton, and few
scholars have spent much time comparatively analyzing the procedural laws of the
various cantons. Indeed, the only comprehensive inter-cantonal comparative study dates

95

See e.g. Jürg Steiner, Amicable Agreement Versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in

Switzerland, rev. ed., trans. by Asger Braendgaard & Barbara Braendgaard, (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1974).
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from the early 1930s,97 and even it does not always go as deep as one might wish for the
purposes of informed decision-making in law reform. As a result, the Committee spent
most of its time learning about, and discussing, the comparative advantages of the
procedural rules of the various cantons. Understandably, this left little time for
international comparative analysis.
Thus far, the reasons for shunning foreign procedural imports described here—strong
federalism, first unification in Swiss history, and consensus democracy—are somewhat
unique to Switzerland. But there are other reasons that are more portable. Recall, for
instance, that one of the tasks on the Committee’s plate was to consider whether to adopt
a class action in matters of labour, landlord-tenant, and consumer disputes. 98 The
Committee quickly disposed of that task by concluding summarily that class actions are
foreign to Swiss traditions. 99 The Committee’s conclusion satisfied lawyers, academics,
and political groups during the public comment period.100 This sentiment was later shared
during the debates in Parliament. 101 Thus, class actions never had a chance of being
introduced into the new Code.
There are a variety of jurisprudential, doctrinal, and cultural reasons why class
actions would be an uneasy fit for the current law of civil procedure in Switzerland. 102
The Committee briefly pointed to some of those reasons in its report. 103 But there was
97
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something else: rejection of the perceived pathologies of US-style litigation. At the heart
of this rejection is a deep unease with the way in which the jury trial 104 —a procedure
steeped in equity, 105 anti-formalism, entrepreneurial lawyering, the prospect of punitive
damages, 106 and the tendency towards the lawsuit as a business deal (which the
aforementioned features support) 107 —result in a litigation system in the United States in
which power (including judicial power), money (who has it and who does not), and
tactics seem to be more important in the outcome of litigation than who is right and who
is wrong on the merits. 108 This unease emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s when what
the Germans call the ”judicial conflict” with the United States resulted in extensive
depictions in German law journals of the US litigation system as arbitrary and unfair—
interestingly unfairness primarily to defendants, but that view should not be surprising,
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given the reports’ provenance in the US tort reform movement. 109 This German
scholarship has influenced Swiss thinking as well, especially in German-speaking
Switzerland. 110 The perception that US courts were exercising their country’s hegemonic
power in dealing with foreign parties and foreign sovereignty concerns further supported
the unease. 111
In the late 1990s, objections to US-style class actions further intensified in
Switzerland in reaction to the Holocaust Assets Litigation, in which several classes of
Holocaust survivors sued the major Swiss banks for conversion of their families’ bank
accounts during and after World War II and for other misdeeds. 112 Although the cases
presented a number of difficult legal and factual questions, they were settled, after 18
months, for $1.25 billion without a single legal ruling by the trial judge. 113 In the United
States, lawyers often see this as an instance in which the class action device helped
elderly Holocaust survivors receive what was rightfully theirs from intransigent Swiss
banks. 114 In Switzerland, however, where considerable parts of the population had
initially been sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims, the episode was ultimately perceived
as further evidence that power, including governmental power, is more important than the
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merits in resolving class actions in the United States. 115 Not surprisingly, then, the
Committee mentioned, as a reason to reject the adoption of class actions in Switzerland,
the perceived danger that “baseless claims would be filed for the sole reason of forcing
the defendant into a settlement.” 116 More generally, this episode hardened the conviction
of many in Switzerland that class actions and other features of US litigation are best
avoided.
Most importantly, however, the lack of borrowing in the new Swiss Code of Civil
Procedure is simply the result of inertia and conservatism in the traditional sense of the
word. 117 Swiss lawyers, as lawyers in many other places, prefer the procedural rules they
know over those they do not. That is not to say that Swiss lawyers consider their
respective cantonal codes to be perfect. Indeed, the rate at which most cantons have
engaged in procedural reform over the past two decades indicates that the opposite is
true. 118 However, most of these reforms have been limited to fiddling with details and
adapting cantonal codes to newly imposed federal law requirements. Bold changes are
unlikely to find favor. Similarly, foreign approaches are viewed with suspicion. The
reason is simple: few lawyers have the necessary knowledge about the ways in which
foreign solutions work in the intertwined edifice of a foreign jurisdiction’s procedural
law, let alone about the often unspoken jurisprudential assumptions that underlie the
application of those solutions, assumptions that are the result of legal education and
acculturation in practice. 119 The upshot is an unwillingness to consider foreign
approaches unless there is a very good reason to do so.
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One way to overcome this inertia, if perhaps not conservatism, is, therefore, to
provide the necessary in-depth comparative background information on how a particular
foreign rule or approach works. As I have suggested elsewhere, a powerful means for this
purpose is the process of negotiating and ratifying treaties, as well as the learning that
occurs through subsequent practice under those treaties. 120 In the present case, article 50
of the Lugano Convention requires member states to enforce a promissory note
authenticated by a notary in another member state if the note conforms to the standards
for such instruments under the law of the originating state. 121 Since Swiss law did not
provide for such an enforceable note, the Swiss negotiators needed to make sure they
understood this instrument and the way it operated in the countries from which such
requests for enforcement would be forthcoming before committing to the Lugano
Convention. They then had to explain the instrument to Parliament for purposes of
ratification of the Convention. Once ratified, article 50, along with the other provisions,
were explicated to the practicing bar by both negotiators and scholarly experts in the
field. 122 Soon, monographs on the operation of article 50 and the instrument of the
enforceable authenticated promissory note appeared. 123 In the end, the drafters of the new
Code had sufficient information on that instrument to consider it worth adopting.
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Another way to overcome inertia consists in forcing change from outside of a
country’s legal elite. Within the European Community, for example, the Commission has
been pushing unification in one specific area of transnational litigation after another. 124
Similarly, the European Court of Justice has declared invalid a number of rules of
domestic civil procedure that discriminate against residents of other member states of the
Community. 125 This has led to a significant increase in research and scholarship in
comparative procedure as well as to increased legislative activity in order to implement
the required changes within the member states. 126 These forced changes have led to
increased borrowing among the member states of the Community. They may even end in
a European code of civil procedure, as some have suggested. 127 Of course, Switzerland is
not a member state of the EC and, thus, has not actively participated in these changes. But
it has ratified a number of international treaties in matters of procedure, which the
drafters of the new Code had to implement.
Finally, during the public comment period of the proposed Code, none of the voices
of public policy criticized the drafters for failing to borrow approaches from abroad. 128
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The one exception was that of mediation firms forcefully complaining about a lack of
reference to mediation. In response, the drafters changed the proposed Code
accordingly. 129 This suggests that politically active groups, too, can support or overcome
standard inertia in this area. The fact that the conduct of transnational litigation by
lawyers and judges in the United States led to an unwillingness in Switzerland to consider
features of US civil procedure as worth emulating seems to further support this
suggestion. 130
V. CONCLUSION
Today, examples of cross-border borrowing in procedural lawmaking are easy to
find. In various European Union countries alone, academic publications are abuzz with
comparative scholarship suggesting the adoption of this or that rule in domestic
procedure. Even in England, which is not bound by article 65 of the Treaty Establishing
the European Community 131 and the many reform proposals imposed by Brussels under
its authority, the Wolf Committee was not shy to borrow from abroad to find solutions to
identified problems with English civil procedure. 132 Taking a step back from these recent
developments, however, it should be clear to anyone with a passing interest in the
comparative history of litigation procedure that cross-border borrowing in this area is
nothing new. It may even be as old as procedural law itself. Robert Millar, for instance,
traces US discovery and other features of equity procedure to early Roman Canonical law
on the European Continent, and other features of US procedural law to early Germanic
procedure. 133
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The interesting question, therefore, is not whether there is borrowing, but when and
why it occurs. One plausible suggestion is that this is mostly a matter of ideas, whether or
not those ideas respond to a specific need of a particular society. 134 But if so, why do
some ideas travel, while others do not, or only to some countries? For instance, the 1806
Code of Civil Procedure of France, 135 however flawed, influenced a great number of
procedural codes on the European Continent at the time. 136 Is this because the 1806 Code
was shaped to some extent by ideas of the French Revolution? Or because it simply
contained ideas whose time had come? If the latter, why was it widely borrowed from
and not the 1667 Code Louis, on which it was largely based? From this perspective, it is
interesting to look at the recent Swiss Code of Civil Procedure and ask about the reasons
why its drafters largely shunned foreign influences—unless required or suggested by
international treaty—and opted instead for inter-cantonal borrowing. To me, the Swiss
example suggests that cross-border borrowing in civil procedure depends not only on the
strength of ideas, but also on an understanding of how particular approaches work within
the litigation system from which to borrow, as well as on the identity and the strength of
the interests of politically active groups. Either way, the traditional inertia in this area can
be overcome by externally forced change. 137
Another thing I think the foregoing look at Swiss civil procedure demonstrates is that
the distinction between common law and civil law systems has often been overdrawn.
The frequent focus in the common law world on two or three “representative” civil law
jurisdictions in the study of comparative procedure has helped to identify differences and
to provide useful perspective. At the same time, however, it has led to generalizations that
do not withstand further scrutiny. As demonstrated above, procedure and court
organization in various Swiss cantons have long differed in considerable respects from
purpose, it helps to remember that early chancellors were clerics with a staff of clerics, all well versed with
Roman Canonical Law. See von Caenegem, supra note 49, at 45.
134
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the stories that usually emanate from the focus on two or three countries. Those different
Swiss approaches seem to be more closely related to features of the US litigation system,
although none of them were borrowed from the common law world. Those who study
instances of convergence in procedural law may want to take this into account in defining
their point of departure.
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